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The empirical link between psychopathology and creativity is often correlational and fraught
with suspiciously causal interpretations. In this paper, we review research in favor of the
position that certain forms of psychopathology that profoundly affect the neural substrates
for rule-based thought (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the quantity of creative production. Because highly productive individuals, irrespective of
psychopathology, often produce work of greater quality, it seems that such an increase in
the quantity of one’s output positively affects the likelihood of generating those statistically
rare acts and achievements identiﬁed and celebrated as creative. We consider evidence
that offers support for such a claim. In addition, we explore ﬁndings from neuroscience that
can address how a neural mechanism, the ﬂexibility of which relies on tradeoffs between
rule-based (e.g., prefrontal cortex) and stimulus-based (e.g., sensorimotor cortex) brain
regions, is inﬂuenced by psychopathology in ways that can alter dramatically the quantity
and quality of creative output.
Keywords: madness, creativity, psychopathology, prefrontal cortex (PFC), hypofrontality, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, genius
INTRODUCTION
There is an undeniable empirical link between psychopathol-
ogy and creativity. By its very nature, however, much of this
work on the “mad genius” is correlational or otherwise method-
ologically compromised and still fraught with suspiciously causal
interpretations (Schlesinger, 2009). In this paper, we ﬁrst discuss
how the persistence of an ancient historical link between cre-
ativity and psychopathology has contributed to the acceptance of
recent empirical evidence at face value, despite its serious method-
ological shortcomings. We then review research that points to a
more nuanced interpretation of these positions, namely that cer-
tain forms of psychopathology that profoundly affect the neural
substrates for rule-based thought can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
quantity of creative production.We propose that psychopathology
that alters prefrontal cortical ﬁltering increases creative production
and, thus, the likelihood of high-quality creative work. We argue
that the link between psychopathology and creativity is indirect,
such that, at least under certain circumstances, the quantity of the
creative output begets its quality.
THE HISTORICAL LINK BETWEEN CREATIVITY AND
MADNESS
What is the historical and cultural link between psychopathol-
ogy and creativity that it should be so pervasively held today? In
Plato’s (1987; trans.) dialog, Ion, one is told that “[a] poet. . .
is a light thing, and winged and holy, and cannot compose
before he gets inspiration and loses control of his senses and
his reason has deserted him” and further that poets can only
compose “not by virtue of a skill, but by divine power” (534b–
c). From this rather singular source, Western culture inherits a
certain ironic awe of creative individuals. Poets (in particular)
are special, set apart, and close to the divine. Unfortunately,
for Plato, they are also of little use, for as much as they are
sporadically close to the gods, their practice misrepresents the
nature of reality (e.g., in contrast to practiced philosophy and
dialectic, which allows one to glimpse beyond the world of appear-
ances); they also fail to educate the youth morally. Regarding
the latter, a poet is an emotional creature and truly only super-
ﬁcially knowledgeable of warfare, medicine, carpentry, etc., even
though such topics might arise in their compositions; thus, if
they are not experts or skilled with even these matters, how
could they be consulted or trusted for matters so important and
lofty as how one ought to behave or the nature of right and
wrong?
What is hard to believe about still regarding the creative individ-
ual as somehow“possessed” or “inspired” (which literally suggests
a vessel being “breathed into,” in+spire) is that it is based on
an ancient argument that sought to privilege philosophers over
poets (and rhapsodes) as authorities in the Greek world, especially
in regards to a general theory of knowledge and the good (see
also Plato’s The republic). Without such an ontological or epis-
temological commitment, modern creativity researchers should
not be so beholden to this position. Indeed, from a modern
research standpoint, studying the creative process given Plato’s
account would be extremely problematic anyway because the
process is essentially regarded as irrational (or non-rule-based)
and—more to the point—its source problematically external to
the very individual in the throes of creation. Interestingly, much
of the Ancient Greek world did not hold such a “passive” view
of poets; there was a comfortable overdetermination of causation
in which a poem was both divine and consciously composed (see
Murray, 1981). Muses did not absolve responsibility; they were
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the personiﬁcation of inspiration, which was the purposeful use
and appeal by the poet to perfectly ordinary cognitive processes
like memory and knowledge, as well as processes that assisted
in meeting the needs of an audience (e.g., ﬂuency in composi-
tion or performance). There was a respectful balance between
what modern researchers can regard as non-conscious productive
processes and those deliberate,more controlled processes. The his-
torical and cultural link between psychopathology and creativity
is fascinating, but it was never a necessary one for either layper-
son or scientist. It is worthwhile to consider how research on
creativity (at least with respect to its relation to psychopathol-
ogy) would be different had views on “possession” been more
moderate.
THE QUANTITY OF CREATIVE PRODUCTION AND THE THIRD
VARIABLE PROBLEM
Perhaps because of the persistent (though problematic) link
betweenpsychopathology and creativity described above, themore
recent empirical one has been easier to establish and accept—
this, despite small sample sizes, lack of generalizability, lack of
statistical signiﬁcance, lack of proper control groups, etc., (see
Schlesinger, 2009). Andreasen (1987) famously interviewed writ-
ers at the University of Iowa Writers’ Workshop and reported that
80% had at least one episode of an affective disorder, two and half
times the level of control participants, and that four times as many
writers had a bipolar disorder diagnosis than control participants.
This link extended to ﬁrst-degree relatives, who themselves had an
increased level of psychopathology. Jamison (1989) also reported
high levels of diagnosis of and treatment and medicalization for
affective disorders in poets and playwrights. The vast majority of
participants also admitted to feelings of enthusiasm, euphoria and
well-being, high energy, and ﬂuency of thought during creative
episodes, suggesting a link between hypomania speciﬁcally and
creativity.
Contrary to these standard accounts suggesting that psy-
chopathology “leads” to creativity, some have even proposed that
creative work may instead precipitate the occurrence of psy-
chopathology (which is at least a logical possibility, see Ramey and
Weisberg, 2004); Kaufman and Baer (2002) have concluded that a
craft and profession like poetry-writing might simply attract those
predisposed to psychopathology in the ﬁrst place; Ludwig (1998)
has found that the psychopathology-creativity link depended on
the extent to which a profession or subject matter was more for-
mal (e.g., science) or subjective (i.e., arts); but such voices are
the minority. The ultimate issue here is one of explanatory moti-
vation. Even with essentially correlational designs, many studies’
conclusions are simply unidirectional with respect to explanation
or insinuation. In fact, a third-variable problem also presents itself
such that any relation between psychopathology (e.g., measured
by diagnosis) and creativity (e.g., measured by the quality of a
poem) could actually be accounted for by their relation to some
other variable (e.g., the quantity of that which is produced, itself
related to energy and motivation to produce in the ﬁrst place).
For example Ramey and Weisberg (2004) tested the hypothesis
and posthumous diagnosis offered by McDermott (2001) that
Emily Dickinson exhibited symptoms of hypomania during her
lifetime and that poems written during these periods would be
“more creative” than poems written during other times (presum-
ably when she did not suffer from any mood disorder). Poems
written during hypomanic yearswere, in fact,more likely to appear
in anthologized works of poetry (a measure of creativity, or qual-
ity) than poems written during other years. This relation, however,
was confounded when Dickinson’s productivity was taken into
account: she also wrote more during her hypomanic years. When
they analyzed her so-called non-mood-disordered years, the like-
lihood of writing a quality poem also increased in years that
she was more productive. Thus, it was productivity, irrespec-
tive of psychopathology, that explained the relative creativity of
her poetry (see also Simonton, 2004; for a similar link between
quantity and quality). In an investigation of the relation between
depression and creativity, Verhaeghen et al. (2005) concluded that
rumination, or the extent to which one focuses on oneself or the
causes of one’s mood, accounted for one’s creativity, not depres-
sion, and that “self-reﬂective rumination prepares individuals to
generate a larger number of ideas” (p. 230). Many of the cre-
ative arts may, thus, function as an accommodating outlet for
such self-reﬂection. In fact, upon closer examination, it seems
that in studies of both eminent and everyday creativity, the link
between psychopathology and creativity is never one of extreme,
incapacitating “madness” and creativity (see Richards and Kinney,
1990). Rather, the link is between creativity and certain symp-
toms (e.g., of hypomania) like focused motivation and drivenness
to create or achieve some goal. In fact, 90% of the writers in
Jamison (1989) indicated that such moods were either integral
or at least very important to their work (see also Jamison et al.,
1980). These are states in which the non-pathological may also
ﬁnd themselves and be creative. An increase in the quantity of
one’s output positively affects the likelihood of generating those
statistically rare acts and achievements identiﬁed and celebrated
as creative. Productivity, self-reﬂection, and elevated moods likely
serve as reinforcers for such continued practice. What is critical,
it seems, is a balance between unfettered productivity and a more
controlled deliberation and evaluation of the volume of produced
material. Modern research in the cognitive and brain sciences,
with no overt ties to Plato, offers an account of creativity under
just such a premise.
NEURAL MECHANISMS SUPPORTING CREATIVE THOUGHT
AND THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Recent neuroscience research has highlighted the potential contri-
bution of both spontaneous and controlled processes to creative
thought (Zabelina and Robinson, 2010). Coming up with novel
ideas or solutions necessitates the ability to generate unexpected
associations, which fosters originality and uniqueness. Generating
a creative product also requires the ability to evaluate the viabil-
ity and efﬁcacy of different available possibilities, as well as an
uninterrupted focus on the creative task until its completion; this
latter process is generally referred to as cognitive control. Cog-
nitive control underlies most aspects of higher-order cognition,
from attention, language, and memory to decision-making and
problem solving. This set of top-down, regulatory mechanisms
is supported by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and promotes the
salience of certain bottom-up, sensory information from either
the environment or the internal state of the organism toward
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context-appropriate responses. Likewise, access to bottom-up,
sensory information that is deemed irrelevant for the task at hand
is diminished or eliminated (Shimamura, 2000; Miller and Cohen,
2001). Although this process of regulatory ﬁltering is undeniably
beneﬁcial for complex cognition, under certain circumstances
exerting top-down inﬂuences might constrain or impede per-
formance on tasks that beneﬁt from spontaneous, bottom-up
thought. This tradeoff is captured by the matched ﬁlter hypothe-
sis (MFH) for cognitive control (Chrysikou et al., 2013b), a recent
theoretical proposal that highlights potential competing interac-
tions betweenprefrontal andposterior or subcortical brain systems
that determine the appropriate level of cognitive control ﬁltering
over bottom-up information for optimal task performance. The
MFH contends that PFC-mediated cognitive control is advanta-
geous for explicit, rule-based tasks, involving the manipulation
of information that does not exceed the representational capacity
of working memory, whereas the exertion of cognitive control is
counterproductive for more automatic tasks, involving informa-
tion that surpasses working memory limitations. For these tasks,
decreased PFC regulatory ﬁltering and increased involvement of
posterior or subcortical systems (e.g., sensorimotor cortex, basal
ganglia) best supports performance (see also Thompson-Schill
et al., 2009).
This proposal offers a potentially ideal explanatory framework
for the neural processes involved in creative thinking generally,
in addition to the likely consequences of psychopathology for
creative production. It has been argued that creative thought
involves a ﬂexible modulation of cognitive control that allows
the creative individual to achieve an optimal balance between
spontaneous and controlled processes during the different phases
of creative production (see Hélie and Sun, 2010; Zabelina and
Robinson, 2010). Recent neuroscientiﬁc evidence suggests that
certain data-driven creativity tasks may beneﬁt from a state of
hypofrontality, wherein limited PFC regulation and the attendant
unconstrained contribution of posterior sensorimotor regions
support the availability of unﬁltered (low-level), raw perceptual
input. For example, participants who were asked to generate an
uncommon use in response to pictures of common objects while
undergoing fMRI showed an increased involvement of posterior,
visual object-processing regions (i.e., occipitotemporal cortex),
bilaterally, but they did not show signiﬁcant activity in left ven-
trolateral PFC regions; in contrast, participants asked to generate
the common use for the same objects showed the reverse effect
(Chrysikou and Thompson-Schill, 2011). What’s more, inhibiting
the left inferior PFC using transcranial direct current stimula-
tion (tDCS) increased the speed in which participants generated
uncommon (but not common) uses for everyday objects, as
well as the number of responses generated, whereas inhibiting
the right PFC or sham stimulation did not affect performance
on either task (Chrysikou et al., 2013a). Critically, patients with
primary progressive aphasia, a neurodegenerative disorder that
primarily affects left PFC, experience increased visual accuracy
in spontaneous drawing, which was not present prior to the
onset of their disease (e.g., Seeley et al., 2008; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2011). Thus, patients diagnosed with certain neuropsycho-
logical disorders that selectively diminish PFC function exhibit
increased access to bottom-up sensory information that can
enhance their performance on some data-driven, higher-order
cognitive tasks. Overall, in line with the MFH, a hypofrontal
cognitive state can be beneﬁcial for certain bottom-up, creative
generation tasks. On the other hand, other aspects of creativ-
ity likely necessitate the contribution of top-down, PFC-guided
regulatory mechanisms. For instance, evaluating the appropri-
ateness of different novel ideas requires frontal cortex mediation
to assess which solution is optimal for the task at hand (e.g.,
Ellamil et al., 2012). As such, creativity involves rapid shifting
between a hypofrontal, generative state and a PFC-guided eval-
uative state, a ﬂexible and dynamic process that likely occurs
iteratively numerous times until the optimal solution to a cre-
ative task is achieved (Hélie and Sun, 2010; Chrysikou et al.,
2013b).
We argue that the negotiation of the tradeoffs between rule-
based and data-driven neurocognitive systems in different creativ-
ity tasks can be altered by vulnerability to certain neuropsychiatric
disorders characterized by PFC hypofunction such as bipolar dis-
order and schizophrenia. A substantial body of work has revealed
that patients with schizophrenia exhibit abnormal PFC proﬁles
marked by either lower or inefﬁcient frontal cortex function in
response to tasks that require cognitive or affective inhibition (e.g.,
Perlstein et al., 2003; Koike et al., 2013; Eich et al., 2014), but not
perceptual ﬁltering (e.g., Smith et al., 2011). Furthermore, a simul-
taneous analysis of global anatomical and functional connectivity
has revealed both lower structural connectivity and diminished
coherence (i.e., either abnormally increased or decreased connec-
tions) in functional connectivity among different brain regions in
patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, relative to healthy control
subjects, that was predictive of symptom severity (Skudlarski et al.,
2010). Similarly, patients with bipolar disorder marked by psy-
chotic features have been shown to exhibit signiﬁcant disruptions
in the frontoparietal control network (e.g., Baker et al., 2014). Such
neurocognitive abnormalities in these forms of psychopathology
mayprolongperiods of hypofrontality in the patients, thus altering
dramatically the quantity of creative output by increasing the gen-
erative phase of creative production. As patients periodically shift
to states of higher PFC regulation (e.g., as a result of pharmaco-
logical treatment), the likelihood of encountering and identifying
particularly viable, high-quality creative ideas increases, due to the
overall increased volume of their creative output. We note that
this model is in line with evidence suggesting higher creativity
in patients with mild forms or those at risk of these disorders
(e.g., Richards and Kinney, 1990; Johnson et al., 2012) and not
in those diagnosed with severe cases of psychopathology char-
acterized by very limited or non-existent regulatory function. In
brief, too little PFC regulation may signiﬁcantly impair the quality
of creative output, whereas too much PFC regulation may limit
the quantity of creative production and, as a result, also hinder
the likelihood of generating an idea that would be characterized
as highly creative (see also Abraham, in press; Abraham et al.,
2007).
CONCLUSION
Much of past research on the relationship between psychopathol-
ogy and creativity is marred by serious methodological limita-
tions, correlational designs, and problematically unidirectional
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interpretations, the prevalence of which might be attributed to the
curiously persistent historical link between creativity and “mad-
ness.” Here we propose that, independent of psychopathology,
highly productive individuals often produce work of greater qual-
ity. As such, an increase in the quantity of one’s output positively
affects the likelihood of generating those statistically rare acts and
achievements identiﬁed and celebrated as creative. We argue that
creativity may depend on a dynamic ﬁltering mechanism, the
ﬂexibility of which relies on tradeoffs between rule-based (e.g.,
PFC) and stimulus-based (e.g., sensorimotor or subcortical) brain
regions, andwhich,when inﬂuenced by psychopathology, can alter
dramatically the quantity—and so quality—of creative output.
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